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Innovation process management 
A B S T R A C T   
People have the power to make an innovation a success or a failure. Corporate decision makers act as both fa-
cilitators and barriers to the introduction of technologies into their organisations. Psychological factors clearly 
have an impact on their decisions and acceptance behaviours, but these have not been fully explored. Conse-
quently, an understanding of these factors is essential for organisations who wish to accelerate technology 
adoption as well as for innovators who face numerous barriers when introducing their new products to the in-
dustrial market. 
The upstream oil and gas (O&G) industry has been characterised as reluctant to adopt new technology. The 
analysis of three technology introduction case studies in the UK offshore O&G sector (including interviews with 
22 personnel involved in developing and commercially buying new technology) confirmed the influence of 15 
psychological factors on organisational technology adoption decision making. These have been organized into a 
framework (P-TAF) consisting of six categories of psychological constructs, namely: personality, attitudes, 
motivation, social, cognitive, and organisational factors. With further development, this preliminary framework 
can be used to develop interventions that support the successful technology uptake in O&G and in other sectors 
experiencing resistance to the introduction of new technology.   
1. Introduction 
Innovation continues to transform the global market and the modern 
workplace, offering potential solutions to the challenges that organisa-
tions face (e.g., climate change, remote working, circular economy, and 
cyber security). This has been illustrated most recently with the Covid- 
19 pandemic in which technology plays a key role in containment and 
mitigation strategies (e.g., testing and contact tracing; Whitelaw et al., 
2020) as well as essential healthcare equipment (Javaid et al., 2020). 
Many people work tirelessly towards developing innovations in a 
fiercely competitive and rapidly changing digital world. Yet their crea-
tions are only successful if they are adopted and used (Frambach and 
Schillewaert, 2002). Reluctance of organisations to adopt new technol-
ogy can result in significant costs, such as through loss of competitive 
advantage and potential revenue (Makkonen et al., 2016; Prybylski, 
2019). With the wave of digitalisation spreading across many industries 
including transport, healthcare, and energy production, understanding 
the organisational innovation adoption process, and the factors which 
influence it, has never been more relevant (Nambisan et al., 2019). 
Psychological barriers to introducing new technology in industry 
include managers’ attitudes and resistance to prototypes being trialled 
on their worksites, their concerns about being an early adopter if there 
could be productivity risks, as well as end-users’ reluctance to change 
familiar ways of working (Kratzer et al., 2017; Roupas, 2008). Under-
standing how these psychological factors influence technological inno-
vation adoption in industrial consumers is vital to support the successful 
introduction of new products and systems. 
Whilst market, economic and organisational factors are frequently 
discussed within the innovation literature, psychological factors can also 
act as powerful facilitators or barriers to corporate and institutional 
technology adoption (Knobloch and Mercure, 2016; Makkonen et al., 
2016). However, these are typically examined to a lesser extent. The 
term ‘psychological’ refers to the spectrum of factors pertaining to the 
mind and behaviour. Recognition of the psychological influences on 
technology adoption places a spotlight onto the individual decision 
makers who determine if a technology is to be introduced (or not) into 
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their organisation. This individual is a central feature in technology 
adoption and acceptance models (e.g., Davis et al., 1989) and is 
particularly relevant within the B2B context where industrial/corporate 
consumers make decisions on behalf of a company. These ‘gatekeepers’ 
can be in formal roles, such as the managers and technical specialists 
who make the pivotal decisions to appraise, trial or adopt technologies 
for deployment in their organisations. However, they can also be in 
informal roles, such as those who determine whether to allow a com-
pany to give a presentation on a new product to their colleagues. The 
gatekeepers are often located at key milestones of the innovation pro-
cess, with the potential to make a significant impact on the success or 
failure of a technology (Nochur and Allen, 1992). 
An industry which exemplifies resistance to technological innovation 
is the oil and gas sector. Innovation is critical to its future success 
(Perrons, 2014; Wood, 2014), however, the road to adoption of new 
technological innovations is not as smooth as might be anticipated 
(Daneshy and Bahorich, 2005). Consequently, examining the consider-
ation of new technologies in O&G offers an interesting perspective from 
an industry which must innovate to survive but is well known for its 
resistance to innovation. This article reports a set of three case studies 
(based on three product types) designed to explore the contribution of 
psychological factors that influence technology adoption, within the UK 
offshore oil and gas industry. 
2. Psychological components of innovation adoption 
Innovation adoption, and the factors which influence it, have been 
studied from multiple perspectives over the past five decades. Whilst a 
full review of this expansive research area is beyond the scope of this 
paper (see Meade and Islam, 2006 for a review), several key models 
should be highlighted in relation to the psychological component of 
innovation adoption. Rogers (1983) diffusion of innovation theory 
(DOI) became a seminal work, providing a framework to understand 
why new ideas and technologies are introduced and integrated (or not) 
into an organisation. His five-stage model of the innovation-decision 
process model (knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and 
confirmation) included psychological factors such as personality char-
acteristics, attitudes, uncertainty, and social norms (Rogers, 2003). This 
has been a highly valuable model for directing subsequent innovation 
research which has also identified additional psychological factors such 
as incentives (green energy; Simpson and Clifton, 2017) and leadership 
(education; Keengwe et al., 2009). Similarly, the Technology Accep-
tance Model (TAM, Davis et al., 1989; Venkatesh and Davis, 2000), 
which also incorporates psychological elements, has been valuable for 
predicting user acceptance of IT systems within the information systems 
literature. It was originally based upon the psychological Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) in order to under-
stand the acceptance behaviours associated with new information 
technologies through users’ attitudes and subjective beliefs. Another 
psychological model was later added to the TAM in the form of the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) by applying the supple-
mentary component of perceived behavioural control (Davis et al., 
1989). Throughout the model’s refinement, further psychological fac-
tors have been added including social influence (Venkatesh and Davis, 
2000), trust and risk (Pavlou, 2003). Although, it has been criticised for 
not recognising the role of emotional, social, and cultural components 
(Bagozzi, 2007). Whilst prominent models do recognize that psycho-
logical factors influence technology acceptance, they are not typically 
all incorporated within one framework for the business technology 
adoption context. 
From an individual consumer perspective, psychological factors that 
have been identified as impacting on acceptance decisions include 
innovativeness (virtual reality in aeronautical assembly; Sagnier et al., 
2020), trust and social influence (automated vehicles; Zhang et al., 
2020). Perceptions of risk, social norms, image, and attitudes have also 
been found to influence rejection decisions (e.g., internet and mobile 
banking; Laukkanen, 2016). Research on managerial judgment and 
decision-making strategies at the individual level has identified psy-
chological factors such as attitudes and social influences (e.g., Bazerman 
and Moore, 2017) and these apply to the technology adoption context (e. 
g., Streletskaya et al., 2020). However, across the literature on indi-
vidual consumers, although psychological influences have been listed (e. 
g., Huijts et al., 2012), these concepts are typically not considered in 
depth or within a comprehensive framework that outlines the full 
spectrum of psychological factors. 
Moving to the corporate level, several key organisational technology 
adoption models include psychological factors (e.g., Frambach and 
Schillewaert, 2002), such as within the acceptance of IT systems 
(Hameed et al., 2012). For example, trust in security has been identified 
as a critical factor for cloud computing acceptance (Schneider and 
Sunyaev, 2016). Risk aversion has been identified as a barrier to inno-
vation procurement in a range of sectors (Uyarra et al., 2014). Charac-
teristics of B2B transactions between industrial consumers may heighten 
the impact of psychological processes and influencing factors, as 
compared to B2C transactions. For example, the longer decision-making 
process within a complex procurement structure and greater reliance on 
expertise and credibility built on long-term relationships (Sethna and 
Blythe, 2016). Organisational innovation adoption is an active behav-
ioural process undertaken by the constituent individuals (see Makkonen 
et al., 2016), consequently it is influenced by their attitudes, motiva-
tions, and social pressures (Roupas, 2008), as well as psychological 
factors operating at an organisational level (e.g., culture; Dziallas and 
Blind, 2019). 
Despite inclusion across multiple literatures, the psychological fac-
tors are unevenly spread across models, theories, sectors, and applica-
tions (Keupp et al., 2012; van Oorschot et al., 2018), resulting in a level 
of confusion. There does not appear to be an integrated framework 
which outlines the potential psychological variables for business tech-
nology adoption. This could be valuable for many sectors which are 
experiencing resistance to technology introduction but need to embrace 
innovation to remain competitive (e.g., healthcare; Williams and Dick-
inson, 2010). In response to this gap, recent research has developed a 
new psychological technology adoption framework (P-TAF) within the 
oil and gas industry (Roberts, Flin, Millar & Corradi, in press) and it will 
be examined in this study. 
2.1. Technology adoption in upstream oil and gas 
The oil and gas industry still provides the majority of energy that is 
used in many countries (e.g. UK Government, 2019; EIA, 2019) by 
searching for and then producing hydrocarbons, often from remote and 
inhospitable locations, such as beneath the oceans. Historically, to cope 
with these hazardous and complex environments, the O&G industry has 
been innovative, developing and deploying a broad arsenal of technol-
ogies including intricate hardware, data analytics, remote monitoring, 
and drone technology for inspections. Some of the inventions which 
were developed for the O&G industry have been applied to other sectors. 
For example, seismic nodes which were designed for exploration have 
been used for monitoring earthquakes or Remotely Operated Vehicles 
(ROVs) developed for O&G subsea surveys are now used by scientists 
across the world (Jacobs, 2019). 
In recent years, the industry has become increasingly competitive 
with multifaceted challenges, such as climate change, decommissioning, 
and a changing workforce (Opito, 2018; Perrons, 2014; Radnejad and 
Vredenburg, 2017). These issues, when combined with the significant 
risks of failure and the high cost of being a first user, have resulted in the 
industry gaining a reputation for being conservative and slow to uptake 
new inventions (Daneshy and Bahorich, 2005; Perrons, 2014; Wood 
Review, 2014; Bereznoy, 2018). To address these barriers, there have 
been recent attempts to encourage the sector to become more technol-
ogy intensive, as can be seen with the accelerator programs, the signif-
icant increase in investment in start-up technology companies ($70 
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million in 2019; Jacobs, 2020), and internal corporate venture units 
designed to foster the development of innovative technologies in major 
producers (Masucci et al., 2020). Despite incremental improvements, it 
is critical that the industry accelerates technology adoption as it moves 
towards becoming an integrated energy sector (Oil and Gas Authority, 
2019). The industry’s residual resistance to technology adoption, pro-
vides an interesting opportunity to examine the technology adoption 
process. 
Roger’s DOI (2003) model also emphasised the importance of the 
level of innovativeness shown by the individual or organisation, with 
early adopters illustrating the greatest openness to new ideas and 
technologies. This is valuable within the context of O&G and psychology 
for two reasons. From an outward perspective, it appears that many 
organisations within the O&G industry can be characterised as late 
adopters. These organisations are slower to adopt products compared to 
other users, showing higher levels of resistance to innovation, and more 
skepticism towards new technologies. According to Jahanmir and Cav-
adas (2018), late adopter firms are particularly influenced by psycho-
logical factors, including attitudes and word of mouth. Evidence from 
O&G industry bodies reflect this, indicating that psychological factors 
play a key role in technology adoption, such as risk aversion (Wood, 
2014), lack of ownership and leadership around technology (OGTC and 
ABB, 2018), combined with a reluctance to change (OGA, 2018). This is 
relevant beyond O&G as late adopters are becoming a larger and more 
influential consumer group (Wells, 2016), particularly in the context of 
digitalisation. To remain competitive, O&G organisations need to 
embrace technological innovation, but previous approaches to induce 
the acceleration of adoption do not appear to have been entirely suc-
cessful. Consequently, the industry provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the psychological factors which influence technology adoption 
decisions. 
2.2. Psychological technology adoption framework 
To address the innovation adoption challenge within O&G, recent 
research has begun to examine the psychological factors that can in-
fluence technology uptake. As outlined above, psychological factors 
have been identified within the innovation management literature, 
however, they are often disparate and unevenly spread across different 
models, making it difficult to determine the key psychological factors 
which may influence technology adoption decision makers. Conse-
quently, a set of possible psychological factors was initially identified 
from a literature review of studies from the oil and gas sector (Roberts & 
Flin, 2020), with reference to the key innovation adoption models 
mentioned above. This initial set was then revised on the basis of the 
findings from an interview study with key technology adoption decision 
makers in upstream O&G (e.g., senior and middle management, tech-
nology adoption consultants and representatives from start-up com-
panies) to determine the psychological factors that influence technology 
adoption decisions. Thematic analysis identified 15 factors, organized 
into six overarching categories (called the Psychological Technology 
Adoption Framework P-TAF) representing major psychological con-
structs influencing technology adoption, (Roberts, Flin, Millar & Corradi 
, in press) as shown in Table 1 below. 
Within this context, psychological is defined as pertaining to mind 
and behaviour and our primary unit of analysis is the individual decision 
maker (typically the corporate buyer or his/her representative). 
Consequently, this framework includes factors from three different 
levels of psychological enquiry: individual (e.g., personality differences 
and attitudes), social (e.g., subjective norms) and organisational (e.g., 
leadership) – all of which can influence technology adoption decisions. 
The interview data indicated that many of the factors are interrelated. 
For example, personality factors such as innovativeness may influence 
technology attitudes, risk perceptions, and leadership (and by proxy, 
organisational culture). Furthermore, there is a degree of conceptual 
overlap. For example, fear of technology failure can be linked to risk 
Table 1 
The preliminary Psychological Technology Adoption Framework (P-TAF): cat-
egories, factors, and definitions.  
Category Factor Definition 
Personality 
Factors 
Individual differences in configuration of characteristics and 
behaviour that encompasses an individual’s adjustment to life, 
including major traits, interests, drives, values, self-concept, 
abilities, and emotional patterns (APA Dictionary).  
Innovativeness An individual’s orientation towards 
novelty and change, relating his or her 
willingness to try out new 
technologies (both in personal life and 
work life) (Hurt et al., 1977;  
Aldahdouh et al., 2019).  
Risk Aversion The tendency, when choosing between 
alternatives, to avoid options that 
entail a risk of loss, even if that risk is 
relatively small (APA Dictionary). 
Motivation 
Factors 
The impetus that gives purpose or direction to behaviour and 
operates in humans at a conscious or unconscious level (APA 
Dictionary).  
Personal Incentives Perceived rewards or punishments (to 
be avoided) acting as drivers for 
behaviours, including desires to 
improve job performance, pay or 
promotion or to avoid redundancy ( 
Gagné and Deci, 2005).  
Fear of Technology 
Failure 
The motives and concerns about the 
consequences of introducing a new 
technology and its potential failure. 
Similar to fear of failure when risk 
taking (Atkinson 1957), often applied 
in a business context (e.g. Cacciotti 
et al., 2016) although in this case, 
relates particularly to the operational 
consequences than personal 
implications for the decision maker. 
Attitude Factors Mental evaluations that an individual forms about people, 
objects, events, or ideas, which can influence subsequent 
behaviour. Attitudes have three components: affective 
(emotions about the object); conative (influence on behaviour 
and actions towards the object); and cognitive (beliefs and 




The evaluations that an individual 
makes about novel technical products 
including the people, objects, events, 
and ideas associated with their 
adoption (Edison and Geissler, 2003).  
Trust The belief that an individual has 
towards people (or objects) regarding 
their ability, reliability, and 
truthfulness (Demolombe, 2004). In 
this context, trust is a belief about not 
only the technology, but all the 
stakeholders involved (e.g. the 
developers, managers involved in 
adopting new technology, leadership) 
(Ratnasingam, 2005). 
Cognitive Factors Mental processes that drive knowledge and understanding of the 
world, including attention, perception, memory, language use 
and problem solving (APA Dictionary).  
Risk Perception The gathering of information and 
making a judgement of the hazard 
level, and potential loss that could be 
incurred, in a given situation (APA 
Dictionary); it involves gathering 
information and making a judgement 
of the risk level, and potential loss that 
could be incurred.  
Technical 
Knowledge 
The process of an individual recalling 
their domain-specific knowledge 
which contributes to his or her 




The sense of surety that an individual 
has about the prediction of current or 
(continued on next page) 
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aversion, risk perceptions and perceptions of uncertainty. The data 
indicated that fear of technology failure in the O & G sector mainly 
concerned anxieties about the repercussions for the adoption decision 
maker of a technology failing. Consequently, it was deemed to fit best as 
a motivation factor i.e., a motive for not introducing a technology. 
Given that many of the factors appear to be interrelated, there is 
likely to be a level of overlap between them. However, the prior inter-
view study data, on which the framework is based, and psychological 
literature indicated that they were sufficiently disparate to be classified 
in this manner. For a full explanation of the categorisation of factors, see 
Roberts, Flin, Millar and Corradi (in press). Nonetheless, the framework 
would benefit from further application to test these categorisations. 
The factors relate to early stages of adoption decisions and processes, 
e.g., a precursor decision to grant access to a technical or operational 
manager, inviting a start-up technology company to give an internal 
presentation to a potential client, or deciding to agree to a field trial (see 
also Afolayan and de la Harpe, 2020). The 15 factors are grounded in 
both the psychological and innovation literatures, with the labelling and 
definition of the main categories and component factors based on the 
terms used for these psychological constructs in the American Psycho-
logical Association Dictionary of Psychology (https://dictionary.apa. 
org/psychology) and the psychological literature. Some of the factors 
(e.g. technical knowledge) have been labelled using terms already 
applied to the concept by the oil and gas sector, in which case, the 
psychological term is given in the definition. 
Given that this is a preliminary framework, additional evidence is 
required to confirm the components and to develop an understanding of 
how they operate. The case study method offers a means of gathering 
data in an attempt to refine and validate it within realistic, specific 
contexts. It may also provide further detail on the influence of the factors 
within different circumstances (e.g., well-established technologies 
compared to start-up company prototypes), to direct future actionable 
tools and recommendations. 
3. Case study aim 
A set of three case studies was produced with a dual purpose. 1. To 
refine the preliminary P-TAF by determining the indications of the 
factors within different circumstances in the upstream UKCS. 2. To 
identify the best practices regarding the control of the psychological 
factors’ impact on successful innovation adoption. The findings could be 
used to inform interventions to support technological innovation 
uptake. 
4. Method 
A multiple-case study approach was used which allows investigation 
of phenomena in their general complexity and within their natural 
environment. Furthermore, it offers the opportunity for cross-case 
comparisons permitting a more vigorous explanation building process 
and understanding of contextual variables’ effects (Chiesa and Frattini, 
2007) which made it an appropriate method for this study. Following 
standard case study practices (Yin, 2017), a multi-pronged approach 
was taken by collecting data from several sources namely, interviews, 
document analysis, and observations (e.g., pitches, events, and online 
videos). To support the reliability of our study, these additional forms of 
observational data and documents were used to complement the inter-
view transcripts through triangulation (Angrosino, 2007). This 
approach is commonly used for examining technology adoption, such as 
within healthcare (Kyratsis et al., 2012), automated driving (Horberry 
et al., 2017), and manufacturing (Trott and Simms, 2017). 
4.1. Case selection 
One of the aims of the study was to understand how psychological 
factors influence technology adoption decisions in different circum-
stances. Therefore, the intention was to select cases which represented 
different aspects of the innovation adoption process, such as different 
technology readiness levels (Mankins, 2009). For example, early-stage 
start-ups trialling innovative technology (TRL7), companies with tech-
nologies which were reaching commercialisation (TRL8), or at market 
technologies which were adopted by some and resisted by others (TRL9 
and adoption). Potential cases were initially selected based on a pur-
poseful sampling technique (Creswell and Poth, 2016) to capture a wide 
range of experiences of introducing new technology into O&G. Selection 
criteria were based upon the study aims and consisted of: companies 
working to introduce new technologies into the UK O&G industry; 
technology developed up to readiness level 7 implying that they were 
nearing commercialisation and potential introduction of the technology 
into an organisation; experiences suggesting barriers to adoption; and 
sufficient time to commit to the case study. An initial list of companies 
and contacts was produced by O&G industry specialists (LC and DM) 
within the sponsoring organisation. Once potential companies were 
identified by the research team, they were invited to participate in the 
study through the UK Oil and Gas Technology Centre contacts. Whilst 
this may have influenced the potential sample, the initial contact list (28 
companies) was sufficiently large, (i.e., covering a wide range of 
different services and readiness levels) to provide a representative 
sample. 
Despite twelve companies initially agreeing to take part, after several 
Table 1 (continued ) 
Category Factor Definition 
future events and states (e.g., 
decisions, or actions), including the 
judged level of confidence about how 




The recollections of positive and 
negative experiences with technology 
and new ways of working (Agarwal 
and Prasad, 1999). 
Social Factors Refers to what can be called social cognition, in which people 
perceive, think about, interpret, categorize, and judge their own 
social behaviors and those of others (APA Dictionary).  
Social Influence Any change in an individual’s 
thoughts, feelings, or behaviours 
caused by other people in relation to 
introducing new ways of working 
(APA Dictionary).  
Subjective Norms A perception that an individual has 
regarding whether people important 
to that individual (e.g., colleagues, 
supervisors) believe that he or she 
should or should not perform a 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). 
Organisational 
Factors 
This refers to the psychological factors that occur at the 
organisational level. An organisation being a structured entity 
(e.g., in business, industry, and services) consisting of various 
components that interact to perform one or more functions. 
(APA Dictionary).  
Leadership The values, behaviours, and attitudes 
of people in all positions of leadership 
and how this influences the 
organisational culture and behaviours 
of employees (Northouse, 2018;  
Hameed et al., 2012).  
Collaboration 
Culture 
The specific aspect of organisational 
culture that relates to how people 
internally and externally work 
together to reach a shared goal ( 
Dodgson, 2018).  
Technology 
Adoption Culture 
The specific aspect of organisational 
culture that relates to how technology 
and innovation is valued within an 
organisation (Frambach and 
Schillewaert, 2002; Kratzer et al., 
2017).  
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months of polite requests and flexibility over the data collection (e.g., 
Skype interviews, flexible times, and locations), only two companies 
enabled access for data collection. Furthermore, a number of the com-
panies had raised concerns about providing contacts from potential 
clients to give a decision maker’s perspective (e.g., discussing slow up-
take of a product might reflect poorly on the developer and/or potential 
client). It was therefore decided to develop a third case by examining a 
technology which has experienced recent technological advances and 
has been introduced by some O&G operators but not others. As this type 
of technology is offered by more than one company, it afforded the 
opportunity to examine this service from multiple perspectives (e.g., the 
technology service providers, operators). 
Whilst recruiting companies for the study was difficult, the addition 
of the third case was beneficial as together the three cases represented 
different aspects of the innovation adoption process – case 1 was an 
early-stage technology in the process of validation; case 2 was a com-
pany which had commercialised their technology with initial contracts 
with major operators; and case 3 was an established set of technologies 
which had been adopted by some but not by others. 
Approval for the study was granted by the university department’s 
Ethics Committee. All the technologies are UK-based but may be 
distributed internationally (see Table 2). 
4.2. Data collection 
Before commencing data collection, case study candidates were 
informed that taking part would entail interviews, as well as sharing 
relevant documents and/or for the researcher to conduct observations, 
where appropriate (e.g., confidential documents). The data collection 
(June–September 2019) consisted of face to face and phone interviews, 
live observations, and document analysis. The interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed for analysis. 
The main company contact (e.g., the original technology developer 
or CEO) was asked to take part in an initial interview lasting approxi-
mately 2 h and split into multiple sessions for convenience. As based 
upon Yin (2017) guidelines, a timeline was produced for each case 
during these initial interviews with the main contacts. This consisted of 
key dates, events, interactions, difficulties, and information relevant to 
the technology adoption journey. It was reviewed by at least one of the 
key stakeholders from the company to confirm accuracy. The timeline 
provided the basis for the subsequent interviews which asked about 
individuals’ jobs, their opinions on the technology and experiences of 
introducing this new technology into the UKCS, including barriers and 
facilitators that impacted on their experience. The remaining interviews 
with other employees and stakeholders each lasted approximately 45 
min. This included interviewing potential gatekeepers and product 
champions. The interview schedule, including the questions asked in the 
initial and subsequent interviews, can be found in Appendix A. 
The types of data collected for each case study are shown in Table 3. 
A total of 22 interviews were conducted with an average interview 
length of 47 min (range 25–120 mins) The total time for all the in-
terviews was 16 h and 55 min. 
In order to get the decision maker’s perspective, the interviews 
included those in potential decision-making roles such as prospective 
clients or technical specialists who may act as initial gatekeepers (e.g., 
technical or operational managers who may agree to a trial). For case 
study 1, two decision makers were interviewed; for case study 2, two 
decision makers were interviewed; for case study 3, six decision makers 
were interviewed. These decision makers could act as potential gate-
keepers, allowing the technology to be trialled or introduced into their 
organisation or block any further uptake activities. Decision makers 
represented approximately half of the sample. Observation data were 
collected on six occasions in the form of field notes (Morgan et al., 2017) 
gathered during live observations (e.g., pitches) and video recordings (e. 
g., video presentations). The total length of observations was 120 min. 
Nine documents were gathered from both confidential company sources 
(e.g., internal reports) and publicly available sources. The total length of 
the documents was approximately 200 pages and where publicly 
available, these are included in the reference section (the details of the 
blog documents are not included to maintain anonymity). The entire 
documents were initially read to provide a background on the cases and 
then analysed using thematic analysis (see below) to identify the un-
derlying psychological factors (Rapley, 2018). 
4.3. Data analysis 
The interviews were recorded, and notes taken. The interview coding 
and analysis was conducted by the two psychologists (RR and RF). 
The transcribed interviews, observation notes and documents were 
analysed using an adapted version of Braun and Clarke (2006) Thematic 
Analysis via the software program Nvivo 11 (QSR International, 2013). 
This is a structured method for identifying, analysing, and reporting 
themes within the interview, observational and document content. This 
process followed a deductive, content analysis method to identify the 
underlying psychological factors that impact on technology adoption in 
the UKCS. An initial coding framework was developed with reference to 
the P-TAF factors with a coding scheme of 15 codes, each representing a 
psychological factor. During this process, the coders remained open for 
additional or alternative psychological codes. 
Each time a theme was identified within the text, this was coded and 
is reflected in the frequency data (Torrens, 2018). The frequencies for 
the interviews, observation and document analysis data are shown in 
Table 3. Frequencies should not be taken to imply importance, issues 
may not be mentioned as interviewees may believe that they are 
obvious, unimportant or of a sensitive nature. Interviewee quotes are 
included throughout the case studies to provide a rich description of the 
themes discussed. Each case study interviewee number is shown in 
brackets after the quote and the psychological factors are shown 
underlined. 
To identify the psychological factors and determine how they influ-
enced the technology adoption decision outcomes, each case was ana-
lysed separately. This allowed immersion within each case before 
examination of the psychological factors identified across the whole 
data set. Discussion of the results with the non-psychologist authors 
provided a valuable opportunity to examine the categorisation of the 
factors. 
Data availability: Data analysis methods are included in the section 
above and the semi-structured interview schedule is in Appendix A, 
however, to maintain the confidentiality and anonymity of the in-
terviewees, as per our ethical requirements, individual data will not be 
made available. 
5. Case study results 
The analysis of the interview data, observations, and document 
analysis identified 15 factors across the three cases which could be 
allocated to the six psychological categories, labelled personality fac-
tors, attitude factors, motivation factors, cognitive factors, social factors, 
and organisational factors as per the P-TAF shown in Table 1. These 
were regarded as influencing the introduction of the new technologies, 
outlined in the three case studies, into the UKCS O&G industry. No 
additional psychological factors were identified. 
The following sections present the results of the three case studies. 
This includes a brief description of the companies and technologies 
within each case. Given the focus of analysis is on the decision maker, 
the results include reference to the gatekeepers, how they were 
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perceived and their role in technology adoption decisions.1 In this 
context, gatekeepers may be in formal roles (e.g., managers and tech-
nical specialists) who make decisions to appraise, trial, or adopt the 
technologies. They can also be in informal roles and who indirectly in-
fluence the decision-making process (e.g., agreeing to and then setting 
up a pitch presentation to their colleagues). A summary of these results, 
as well as the findings on psychological facilitators and barriers, are 
given at the end of the section. 
5.1. Case study 1: Well sealant 
This company focuses on well barrier solutions and the technology is 
a well sealant which is pumped into the subsea wellbore. This can be 
used to seal off unwanted fluids (e.g. water or hydrocarbons) and leaks 
from the seabed around the wellbore. The technology had originally 
been developed for well abandonment and decommissioning (i.e. where 
a well is blocked off so that it can be safely closed, and the subsea 
infrastructure and equipment can be taken out of use). However, the 
company decided to pivot after receiving considerable resistance to-
wards the product for well abandonment and began to explore its use for 
well integrity instead (i.e. maintenance of an active subsea well). From 5 
interviews, document analysis and 30 min of observations, 14 out of the 
15 factors were identified (all six categories were represented) as 
influencing the development and early deployment of this technology 
(shown in Table 4). 
Personality differences were identified in the context of the inno-
vativeness of technology gatekeepers and decision makers. The CEO 
perceived that gatekeepers (e.g., individuals who may set up a presen-
tation, provide access to a budget holder or decision maker, or managers 
who may agree to and set up trialling the technology) and potential 
gatekeepers tended to have a mix of innovativeness. In some instances, 
he judged them to be innovative, open minded and comfortable with 
new technology. This was summarised by the CEO below: 
“You’ve got the generation of people who have grown up using computers 
and programming and coding and using iPads and wireless technology. 
Generally, they have got another twenty, thirty-plus years in their career, 
they’re looking at going “yeah, this could be a problem I’m going to have 
to deal with in the future. Yeah, let’s look at something now.” (CS1–I1: 
developer). 
This was contrasted by gatekeepers and potential decision makers 
who appeared to be risk averse and were uncomfortable about new 
technology, being described as “dinosaurs” (CS1–I2: developer). 
Initially the CEO experienced negative technology attitudes in the 
form of gatekeepers and decision makers resistance towards their new 
product being used for well abandonment. In one example, he spoke 
about talking to a large operator within the UKCS who had such an 
aggressive, anti-technology attitude that he felt they “pretty much got 
chased out” (CS1–I2: developer). These attitudes, in part, led to the 
company changing from promoting the well sealant for well abandon-
ment to a well integrity application. This strategy proved to be effective, 
and the technology attitudes they encountered became positive with 
prospective clients becoming more open and interested in the product. 
One potential decision maker and gatekeeper noted that “We thought we 
might have faced quite an uphill battle to get some of the larger organisations 
even interested in playing in this area, but I think the tide is almost changing 
with regards to the attitudes around using solutions developed by start-up 
companies” (CS1–I4: decision maker). One of the developers suggested 
that this positive attitude change may be a result of “[companies] possibly 
being hit on the bottom line when they’ve not adopted these technologies, so 
attitudes have definitely improved in the North Sea” (CS1–I3: developer). 
The developers perceived some of the gatekeepers with whom they 
interacted to hold significant power over the outcome of the interaction 
(e.g., whether their technology may be trialled into the gatekeeper’s 
organisation), and that was heavily influenced by the gatekeeper’s at-
titudes and motivations (see below). However, this power was not 
perceived to be effective outside the gatekeeper’s sphere of control (e.g., 
their department or organisation) and should the developers encounter a 
resistive gatekeeper they would “not bother talking to you, we’ll work 
round you, talk to someone else, work elsewhere” (CS1–I2: developer). 
A key influencing factor on gatekeepers’ negative technology atti-
tudes and decisions that he encountered was motivations. This included 
gatekeepers’ and decision makers’ personal incentives about job 
Table 2 
Case study details.  
Case Study Stage Technology Company size (employees = n) 
1. Well Sealant Early-stage technology; in process of validation 
with several operators. 
One technology; potential to be adapted to multiple applications 3 
2. Subsea Well 
Construction 
Commercialisation; several contracts with tier 1 
operators. 
Two technologies developed in parallel. 8 
3. Non-Intrusive 
Inspection 
Well established range of technologies available 
at market. 
Several different NII techniques including ultrasonics (UT), phased 
array ultrasonics (PAUT), radiography (RT). 
Wide range of companies 
offering NII services.  
Table 3 
Data collection methods for each case study.  





Roles of individuals Interviewed Observations Documents Total no. 
of sources 
1. Well Sealant 5 225 mins CEO (1), company staff (2). Technical/operational managers of 
other organisations (2 – decision makers) 
30 mins (live) + 1x 
online video (15 
mins) 
3 (online blogs) 10 
2. Subsea Well 
Construction 
6 280 mins CEO (1), company staff including directors (3). Technical/ 
operational managers in other organisations (2 – decision 
makers). 







11 510 mins Asset integrity managers from operators (3 – decision makers) 
and contractors (3 – decision makers). NII service company 
technical specialists (3-developers). Technology centre 
advisors (2). 
2x online videos (15 





1 We would like to thank one of the reviewers for highlighting the critical role 
of the gatekeeper and the data were re-examined to provide a fuller examina-
tion of the gatekeeper and product champion’s roles, the powers perceived to 
be assigned to them, and the psychological factors which influence them. 
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security and being unwilling to take a risk or make a change towards the 
end of a contract or career. The developer recognised that adopting new 
technology may represent further work for companies, consultants who 
are working with traditional methods “may feel threatened” (CS1–I2: 
developer), and summarised gatekeeper’s potential motivations as 
below: 
“There are other aspects of, what’s in it for these guys? And we talked 
about the motivations, and is it just a headache? Is it just a risk? Is it 
unhousing one of their best friends that takes them out to play golf every 
year? You know, they’ve got a corporate box at football that they go to, 
stuff like that.” (CS1–I2: developer) 
Trust was identified as a key facilitating factor to work against 
negative attitudes and motivations. The well sealant company created 
trust with potential gatekeepers and clients by being honest about their 
technical experience. “And just being open and speaking about the oppor-
tunity for any new technologies, not ours, not pushing it” (CS1–I3: devel-
oper) appears to have been an effective method for growing credibility. 
Fear of technology failure was not identified within the data. 
When deployed for well abandonment, the sealant also allowed large 
sections of equipment to be left in the seabed, offering considerable 
savings (e.g., rig hire, days required to pull tubing out). Consequently, 
“if you get it right, there is a billion-pound prize out there for industry” 
(CS1–I5: decision maker). However, the gatekeepers and decision 
makers recognised that in some situations risk perception was too high 
for well abandonment as should the sealant fail, there could be signifi-
cant consequences. “If you’re putting it as a permanent barrier, then what 
you’re saying is in perpetuity that barrier will hold any hydrocarbons from 
escaping to the environment, and therefore you have to qualify that barrier 
against Oil and Gas UK guidelines for barrier materials. And until you do 
that, nobody’s going to accept it” (CS1–I5: decision maker). This may in 
part be due to the gatekeepers and decision makers perceived uncer-
tainty associated with such a long period of time. “There’s a psychology of 
forever” (CS1–I3: developer) that makes people nervous. 
The company pivoted by considering alternative applications of the 
sealant, including well integrity as “it’s a lower risk, and it’s not a per-
manent integrity part of the well, and if the water ultimately comes back in, 
you’re no worse off than you were in the first place, and hopefully it’s lasted 
for a while and you’ve got more oil out” (CS1–I5: decision maker). In 
addition, they recognised that applying this sealant to land rigs would 
reduce the risk and cost involved to the operator. As a result of this new 
strategy, several managers (acting as gatekeepers and potential decision 
makers) were keen to use the technology for current problems and up-
coming campaigns, leading to field trials. Gatekeeper’s negative previ-
ous experiences of deploying technologies that were perceived to be 
similar were also found to be influential. Technical knowledge was an 
influencing factor upon risk perceptions and technology decision mak-
ing, particularly that of gatekeepers to be able to assess the relative value 
that the technology may offer the organisation. It was noted that there 
was a need for further knowledge to support effective decision making 
regarding using the well sealant for well integrity - “we need to rewrite 
guidelines that we can get these materials in the right space” (CS1–I5: de-
cision maker). One-way of doing this was to use hands-on demonstra-
tions to increase familiarity during a pitch: 
‘He uses a demonstration to visually demonstrate how the product 
works by mixing a powder into a clear flask of water and stirring with 
a coffee stick – he later tips the flask confidently to show the fluid has 
set. The audience responds well with sounds of exclamation’ (CS1- 
Observation Notes 1 (observing developer)). 
Social factors including social influences and subjective norms 
appear to have shaped the success of technology uptake within this case. 
Developing a broad professional network was highly valuable for the 
CEO, using connections from previous roles to conduct initial customer 
validation and gain access to potential clients. This included building 
relationships with the gatekeepers and decision makers to understand 
the problems that they are facing - “the most success I’ve ever had is where 
I’ve not even opened the computer, you sit there with a notebook, you talk 
about what you can do, what their problems are, and you see if there’s any 
common ground” (CS1–I1: developer). Taking part in an accelerator 
programme meant that “you’re not just a single entity on your own, you’re 
with a group of other companies at a similar stage, the visibility that he got 
was probably a lot higher than what he was able to achieve alone” (CS1–I3: 
developer). Subjective norms around well abandonment appear to have 
been a potential barrier to uptake of the well sealant. Typically, standard 
practices focus on removing any materials downhole and using cement 
Table 4 
The total number of times each P-TAF factor was mentioned in the interviews, observations, and document analysis.  
Category Factor Number of times coded across data 
Total (Observations & Document 
Analysis) 
Case Study 1: Subsea well 
construction 
Case Study 2: Well 
sealant 
Case Study 3: non-intrusive 
inspection 
Personality Factors  27 (0 &3) 8 16 3  
Innovativeness 24 (0&3) 7 14 3  
Risk Aversion 3 (0&0) 1 2 0 
Motivation Factors  59 (0&4) 20 9 30  
Personal Incentives 58 (0 &4) 20 9 29  
Fear of Technology 
Failure 
1 (0&0) 0 0 1 
Attitude Factors  111 (4 &3) 35 32 44  
Technology Attitudes 67 (0&1) 13 19 35  
Trust 44 (4&2) 22 13 9 
Cognitive Factors  235 (5& 29) 59 59 117  
Risk Perception 145 (5&14) 45 43 57  
Technical Knowledge 62 (0&11) 6 9 47  
Perception of Certainty 15 (0&0) 4 4 7  
Previous Experience 13 (0&4) 4 3 6 
Social Factors  123 (6&2) 65 26 32  
Social Influences 111 (6&1) 60 26 25  
Subjective Norms 12 (0&1) 5 0 7 
Organisational 
Factors  
117 (0&4) 35 24 58  
Leadership 32 (0&1) 4 3 25  
Collaboration Culture 16 (0&4) 2 0 14  
Technology Adoption 
Culture 
69 (0&0) 29 21 19  
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as the go-to material. Whilst there have been changes in industry norms 
recently, there still appears to be a reluctance to change traditional 
behaviours. One of the developers articulated as “I’ve been warned not to 
challenge the status quo and I just threw a cat in amongst the pigeons and 
legged it, you know?” (CS1–I3: developer). 
The developers assigned power to the impact that product cham-
pions could have on the success of their technology. Fostering a pro-
fessional network of individuals who recognised the value of the 
technology was crucial for creating product champions who bought into 
the technology and provided potential routes to trial. In particular, 
“within the operating companies that you’ll end up with the champion in the 
wells team like “this is great, really want that”” (CS1–I4: decision maker). 
In one instance, a product champion was able to secure the company a 
trial on a well in another country, through the champion’s network of 
contacts within the client company. This provided the company with 
early validation data off the back of which they secured further trials and 
eventually contracts. The reporting lines were different depending on 
the individual champions as “you obviously have different communication 
with different departments in the operating companies so the in wells might be 
like “this is great, really want that” but I need to talk to so and so to get it 
signed off” (CS1–I2: developer). In contrast, individuals could harness 
their social networks to block the uptake of the well sealant within a 
company, who “really got the bit between his teeth to try and cause some 
problems” (CS1–I2: developer). The developer termed these “product 
snipers” (CS1–I1: developer). 
The overall industry technology adoption culture around innovation 
was identified as a potential barrier. Developers “can create all the new 
solutions to industry problems, but unless people within the oil & gas oper-
ators are willing to be innovative themselves, and try something different, then 
things will never change” (CS1–I2: developer). Collaboration culture was 
also briefly mentioned by the CEO regarding how he would like to see 
his own company work internally. Leadership is a fundamental driver 
for that cultural change in which they send out a message at the top level 
of the (customer) company and pass this down throughout the 
organisation. 
5.2. Case study 2: subsea Well construction 
The company focuses on well construction technologies that aim to 
save rig time with two technologies it developed. Subsea wellbores 
require complex engineering technologies, equipment, and processes to 
build these structures to gain access to hydrocarbons. The “Downhole 
Technology (DownholeT)” was developed first to support more efficient 
cementing operations (i.e., the cementing of the metal casing tubes into 
the seabed and below). The “Subsea Technology (SubseaT)” was 
developed about a year later with the aim of allowing operations within 
a wider ‘weather window’ for subsea operations (i.e., the technology 
allows normal operations, which would otherwise halt during poor 
weather). A further portfolio of technologies has subsequently been 
created but the case study will focus upon the first two. As these were 
developed in parallel within the same company, both technologies were 
analysed together. From six interviews, two online video observations 
and document analysis, 12 out of the 15 factors across the six psycho-
logical categories were identified as influencing the introduction of 
these two different well construction technologies (see Table 4). 
Personality characteristics were identified in the context of the 
innovativeness of the gatekeepers, product champions and adopting 
organisation leadership. For example, it was reported that the product 
champions for these devices were typically open minded, innovative 
individuals. In some instances, technology decision makers were risk 
averse and displayed a “fear of the unknown” (CS2–I5: decision maker). 
In addition, it was found to be valuable to be able to identify the relative 
innovativeness and risk-aversion of potential contacts during early trials 
and throughout the commercialisation process, such as clients, end- 
users, and technical experts. One of the developers suggested that it 
was valuable to “know who is innovative - these are individuals who are 
willing to try something. But then identifying those who perhaps are not 
innovative and are conservative, and just manoeuvring round them.” 
(CS2–I3: developer).” 
In terms of the DownholeT, gatekeepers within the two potential 
customer companies who sponsored trials had positive technology at-
titudes, recognising that whilst it would not make a radical change to 
well construction, the technology could make a significant saving for 
well construction budgets in a relatively straightforward way. These 
gatekeepers’ attitudes facilitated the positive technology decision to 
conduct the field trials - “it was low hanging fruit, and so they were the ones 
that jumped at the first instance” (CS2–I2: developer). However, once the 
CEO took the technology out to market, he was met with the familiar 
reluctant attitude that “they didn’t want to be first, they couldn’t take the 
risk, or were unsure about committing so they said, “you need to go away and 
prove it”” (CS2–I6: decision maker). An attitude preferring the status 
quo and being comfortable using current practices was likely a barrier to 
adoption. 
The CEO perceived that gatekeepers, and their attitudes, had the 
power to facilitate positive technology decisions within their context (e. 
g., within their own organisations or social groups) as “when they were on 
board, doors opened more quickly” (CS2–I1: developer). Alternatively, 
where negative technology attitudes persisted, decision makers could 
act as powerful blockers to any further actions or uptake, as illustrated 
by the example below: 
“Most people went away from the project thinking that was good. There 
was one guy who was headed back to Norway where he was working, and 
he went back still “this was a waste of time, we shouldn’t have done it.” 
The rest felt there was a lot of benefit. He was quite keen that anything 
went wrong was blamed on the tech, even if it wasn’t. So, sometimes you 
have to agree to disagree and he was a real challenge.” (CS2–I5: Decision 
maker). 
In these situations, the developers communicated that they would 
“work around” (CS2–I3: developer) these gatekeepers to reach other 
potential champions or decision makers who may be more inclined to-
wards the technology. Furthermore, it was not just the attitude of a 
single gatekeeper or decision maker that could have an impact on a trial 
or outcome but of the wider decision-making structure. Both developers 
and decision makers recognised the wider context. “Breaking down the 
barriers that might be in [an operating company] means trying to get the 
contacts of everyone involved, trying to convince them, trying to convince 
your line management – it’s what we have to prove and get the confidence and 
qualification of the product.” (CS2–I5: decision maker). 
Developing a sense of trust between the developer and potential 
clients, as well as for the credibility of the technology was found to be 
crucial. Trust played a key role in getting support for field trials and 
subsequent contracts for both the products. “A lot of it comes down to 
trusting the individual and their capability to deliver, so somebody who is new 
has to prove themselves” (CS2–I6: decision maker). One of the company 
directors recognised that fostering trust between the developer and the 
clients (e.g., gatekeepers and potential decision makers) is imperative 
for early-stage companies as “Concerns regarding the customer is multiplied 
by at least a hundred time when it’s a start-up compared to [ a tier 1 service 
company]” (CS2–I4: developer). Credibility could also come in the from 
promotional materials such as the videos of the SubseaT trials which 
were “filmed in the workshop with the tooling in the background, increasing 
the credibility of the CEO” (CS2 – OBS2: observing developers and deci-
sion makers)”. Having two companies involved in the DownholeT trials, 
increased the sense of credibility of the technology in which the 
expertise of each company endorsed the involvement of the other - from 
one company’s point of view, “oh, they’re doing it, so it must be good” 
(CS2–I2: developer) (see Social Influences below). 
In terms of SubseaT, initially, a supermajor had initially shown in-
terest in the product recognising that it could solve a problem that they 
currently had in terms of poor weather. However, personal incentives 
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changed when the company experienced a merger. The individuals who 
had originally been gatekeepers and product champions changed their 
priorities, motivated by individual concerns including job security: 
“From a psychology respect, people do business with people, and if people’s 
reputations, jobs, mortgages, are on the line, do they want to stick their head 
above the parapet?” (CS2–I5: decision maker) Nonetheless, the clear 
value proposition continued to foster positive technology attitudes to-
wards the SubseaT: “Doors opened up quicker because the technology was 
easy to articulate. So, people were like “oh, that’s cool. Really awesome” 
(CS2–I2: developer). Fear of technology failure was not identified within 
the data. 
The DownholeT offered to improve efficiency of cementing opera-
tions but initially it was “a bit more of a tricky value proposition to 
comprehend or to easily articulate in a sentence or two in the elevator pitch” 
(CS2–I1: developer). This made it much more difficult to sell the idea of 
the DownholeT and this influenced the risk perception. It was through 
market validation with the clients during product trials that the value 
proposition was more clearly expressed and that in some circumstances 
the DownholeT was perceived to be lower risk than the traditional so-
lution. One of the developers articulated the importance of identifying 
gatekeepers and champions as “You’ve almost got to find the right people 
that just get it, just understand. It does sometimes feel like a roll of the dice” 
(CS2–I1: developer). It is worth noting that sponsoring companies’ de-
cision makers and product champions saw the value of the product in the 
long term for use in another basin and were perceived to be de-risking 
the trialling of it by doing it in the UKCS. “It was more taking a long 
term view of [it], doesn’t offer a great benefit right now, but if we combine it 
with various other things and we take a longer term view, that’s where we can 
start to see the significant benefit” (CS2–I5: decision maker). 
The SubseaT offered to open-up the weather window for well oper-
ations. This value proposition was much more comprehendible, and the 
company had a prototype in which clients could tangibly understand 
how it worked. However, should it fail, the risks such as the financial 
consequences could be significant in terms of damage to the subsea ar-
chitecture and lost production time. The developers felt that “given the 
risk profile, it’s just not something that people [gatekeepers and decision 
makers] want to take on in the first instance” (CS2–I3: developer). “And 
that’s the dichotomy of introducing technology that will save rig time, because 
if it doesn’t go right, it may cost you more time” (CS2–I4: developer). 
Having tangible prototypes that could be touched, footage of the 
technologies in action from the field trials and involvement from several 
stakeholders helped to reduce decision makers’ perceptions of uncer-
tainty and partially de-risk the technologies. In addition, having a pair of 
sponsoring companies helped to reduce the perceived risk of being first – 
“they probably did feel as though they were sharing the risk because it was 
like “we’ll support the yard test”, and then both people can understand the 
learning from that” (CS2–I6: decision maker). A lack of the requisite 
technical knowledge required to accurately assess the risks and negative 
previous experiences were also found to act as potential barriers. In 
particular, the technical knowledge level (e.g., in relation to that tech-
nical area) and prior technology adoption experiences (e.g., in general 
and of deploying technologies which were perceived to be similar) of 
gatekeepers and decision makers were found to be influential. 
Social influences also impacted on the technology journey at a 
broader level. There was a need to understand the social group involved 
in making the technology decision: “At the end of the day, who is the 
buyer? You’ve got to convince the drilling engineer who is putting the program 
together, you’ve also got to convince his boss, the drilling manager. And then 
his boss is the asset manager. So, you have to make sure that when you’re 
talking to one customer, you’re talking to different arms of the one customer 
so that all of those risks and all of those buyers who are inputting to the buying 
cycle are also covered” (CS2–I5: decision maker). Examples of positive 
social influence include early engagement with end-users which was 
valuable for both the DownholeT and SubseaT to provide initial market 
validation and gain endorsement from the operator community. As a 
result, the CEO fostered a broad professional peer network of 
connections with “the business growing organically through that network” 
(CS2–I2: developer). The use of social influences to the company’s 
advantage was also seen in a promotional video about the trial of the 
DownholeT in which it ‘includes interview footage of representatives 
from both [operator company] and the [sponsoring company] talking 
about the technology, what problem it addresses and its value’ (CS2- 
Observation 2 (observing decision makers)). Subjective norms were not 
identified within the data. 
Product champions within these sponsoring organisations and po-
tential clients were fundamental for the successful technology outcomes. 
“The big organisations get that reputation of being the reluctant ones to move 
forward and change, but I think ultimately, it’s not necessarily the organi-
sation, it’s usually the individual that drives it forward in an organisation” 
(CS2–I6: decision maker). The developers placed significant value on 
the impact that product champions could have on the successful 
outcome of a meeting, trial, or decision to commercialise. For example, 
“from essentially not going anywhere, you get a couple of calls, and the 
consequences of those couple of calls are incredible” (CS2–I4: developer). 
The CEO illustrated the impact that having (or not having) a champion 
could have on the success of a technology: 
“I suppose the difficulty was then that we didn’t really have that internal 
champion to the same extent we did with XX at [operating company] or 
XX at [operating company] for the SubseaT. The [operating company] 
team were not at the same level of commitment from a champion 
perspective for the DownholeT and not having that onus and feeling of 
ownership of the technology slowed things down” (CS2–I2: developer). 
Organisational level factors were identified as influencing the 
response to the technologies. Of the two companies involved in the 
DownholeT trials, it was perceived that the smaller operator had a 
positive technology adoption culture and that “trying something new, this 
was bread and butter to them” (CS2–I3: developer). Whereas the super-
major had a less innovative technology culture and that the drive to 
innovate came from senior leadership within the organisation “saying we 
want to try this technology for the following reasons and we’ll endorse you 
going and trialling it” (CS2–I4: developer). Similarly, for the SubseaT, the 
drilling operator had developed a reputation for being an innovator and 
that they “liked the kudos” (CS2–I4: developer) that it gave them. 
Innovation was a key part of their culture, vision, and goals “with their 
own mindset that has got a much more aggressive weighting towards new 
technology and accepting that value” (CS2–I5). Collaboration culture was 
not identified within the data. 
5.3. Case study 3: Non-intrusive inspection 
This case deals with a technology called Non-Intrusive Inspection 
(NII) and is used to inspect assets such as pressure vessels or tanks for the 
presence of corrosion (or other defects and conditions). This type of 
technology has been previously used within process industries, but only 
recent technological advances have offered significant financial benefits 
for application within O&G. A range of NII technologies are provided by 
several companies rather than being exclusive to one source. The 
traditional inspection method is for personnel to enter confined spaces 
(e.g., vessels) to conduct an Internal Visual Inspection (IVI) which means 
that the process must be stopped to allow this. NII is a maintenance 
technique that refers to inspecting with scanning technology so that the 
equipment to be tested can remain in operation rather than shutting it 
down as worker entry is not required. Methods of NII include ultrasonics 
(UT), phased array ultrasonics (PAUT), radiography (RT). From eleven 
interviews, two online video observations and document analysis 14 out 
of the 15 factors across the six categories were identified as influencing 
the introduction of NII technologies in the UKCS offshore oil and gas 
industry (see Table 4). 
There was minimal reference to personality traits within these in-
terviews although it was mentioned that inspection engineers (acting as 
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gatekeepers and decision makers) who were perceived as innovative 
tended to respond more positively to NII. Risk aversion was not identi-
fied in the data. This is likely influenced by risk perceptions, technical 
knowledge, and technology attitudes (see below). 
There was a mix of technology attitudes expressed towards the 
introduction and adoption of NII. On one hand, there appeared to be a 
positive recognition of the value that NII offers but this was balanced by 
an attitude that did not see the value in changing current practices. 
‘There was little appetite for change’ (Document example from OGTC & 
ABB Phase 1 Report) was a common sentiment. A lack of engagement in 
the technologies available and an attitude of “we’ve always done it this 
way” (CS3–I10: decision maker) further illustrated a negative bias to-
wards NII. However, there is evidence that this technology attitude is 
beginning to change with many organisations now engaging with NII 
and shifting their procedures to reflect that. 
The developers perceived some of the gatekeepers which they 
interacted to hold significant power over the outcome of the interaction 
(e.g., whether their technology may be trialled into the gatekeeper’s 
organisation), and that was heavily influenced by the gatekeeper’s at-
titudes and motivations (see below). However, this power was not 
perceived to be effective outside the gatekeeper’s sphere of control (e.g., 
their department or organisation) and should the developers encounter a 
resistive gatekeeper they would “not bother talking to you, we’ll work 
round you, talk to someone else, work elsewhere” (CS1–I2: developer). 
The results indicated that the developers of the NII technologies 
perceived that some of the gatekeepers which they interacted with held 
substantial power over the interaction (e.g., whether the gatekeeper’s 
organisation would introduce one of their technologies) but much less so 
over the overall success of the technology. This was in part due to the 
changing attitudes towards NII within the industry. As one NII developer 
put it “there has been a pretty substantial change, really noticeable change 
probably in the last five years or so, in terms of uptake. And change in attitude 
of some companies where historically they were saying “we’re not going to do 
this” or “we’re not going to do it on any scale, we’ll do it on a special case 
basis.” Some of those companies are really shifting over to becoming real 
implementers” (CS3– I4: developer). In essence, as uptake increased 
across the industry, the power that individual gatekeepers and decision 
makers held to block adoption decreased. 
Gatekeepers’ and decision makers’ technology attitudes towards NII 
were influenced by motivations and trust. Asset integrity managers 
make the inspection decisions, and it is their budget that pays for NII. 
The interviews suggested that there is limited trust in NII methods 
compared to traditional internal visual inspection. This included “res-
ervations, within the industry, about the competence of the NDT technicians 
[that] would clearly have an adverse impact on the further application of NII” 
(CS3-Internal document). This could negatively impact decision makers’ 
and users’ ability to trust the service companies’ competence to accu-
rately interpret the NII data. 
Typically, the benefits from NII are accrued by other departments, 
such as production, and in a longer time scale. Consequently, there may 
be little personal incentives to change if the decision makers do not 
receive any recognition for the value that they created. “People aren’t 
going to change without generally having a reasonable motivation” (CS3–I9: 
decision maker). For example, “We had one client who did NII on two 
vessels and it pretty much took up his entire budget for the year. So, it might 
have saved the shutdown millions of Pounds, but he’s not getting any 
recognition really for that. And he’s stuck with now no budget left to do any 
more” (CS3–I5). Concerns about job security were also identified in 
terms of inspection engineers being replaced and businesses that have 
“vested interests in maintaining the status quo as they benefit from the way 
things are” (CS3–I8: decision maker). Fear of technology failure was 
briefly mentioned in relation to concerns that should NII fail to detect an 
anomaly the consequences could be disastrous. 
NII offers a range of benefits including considerable financial sav-
ings, lower maintenance costs, increased equipment availability, and 
reducing lost and deferred production time. In addition, it means that 
there are fewer confined space entries, significantly reducing personal 
safety risks. One of the publicly available industry documents charac-
terised it as “any technique that allows vessel internal condition to be 
inspected or otherwise assessed without requiring anyone to enter has clear 
advantages with respect to reduced downtime, more frequent assessment and 
improved safety” (Lockheed Martin, 2016). However, these appear to be 
offset by the costs/risks associated with using it. “NII can be more 
expensive to actually do. But it’s because it’s the savings that you get from 
avoiding shutdown that make it cost effective” (CS3–I5: developer). Yet 
these savings are not typically seen in the short term as discussed above. 
The potential consequences of integrity loss can be huge in terms of 
process safety, personal safety, and financial repercussions. As one de-
cision maker noted “the consequences of getting some of the things that we 
do to manage risk, the consequences of getting some of those wrong are 
disastrous. When you consider that, maybe we’re prudent to have hesitancy” 
(CS3–I6). Consequently, there is a high perception of risk and re-
sponsibility involved in asset integrity, that engineers (both as gate-
keepers and decision makers) are fully aware of when making inspection 
decisions. 
In terms of the risk perception associated with probability of detec-
tion of degradation (e.g., corrosion on metal tanks), it appears from the 
evidence available that in some instances this may be erroneous. For 
example, assuming competence of both NII technicians and inspection 
engineers, an NII method may provide a probability of detection at 
approximately 90–95% (OGTC & ABB, 2018) whereas a human con-
ducting IVI may provide a probability of detection of between 58 and 
67% (HSE, 2008). However, this does not appear to reflect the current 
risk perception of gatekeepers and decision makers as “intrusive inspec-
tion is not the gold standard, but everybody thinks it is” (CS3–I2: industry 
technology advisor). 
For both NII and IVI, a high level of technical knowledge is required 
to determine which method is appropriate, to conduct the inspection to 
a high level of competence and accuracy, and to interpret the results in 
order to make the correct subsequent decisions. Engineers acting as 
gatekeepers and decision makers require a high level of knowledge and 
experience to accurately assess the relative advantages of NII within a 
specific context however, “people are getting involved in decision making in 
all these sorts of areas are not necessarily the most competent and knowl-
edgeable people on integrity and inspection issues” (CS3–I11: decision 
maker). Furthermore, interviewees highlighted concerns around a lack 
of expertise on both the developer and decision maker fronts. “We need 
to demystify what goes on in inspection. Not so that senior managers know 
every step, but so they have an understanding of how this works and what 
they need” (CS3–I2: industry technology advisor). 
These concerns may be partly influenced by perceptions of uncer-
tainty and negative previous experiences. Several interviewees dis-
cussed examples in which degradation was missed by the service 
provider and only retrospectively, after an incident, was the issue 
identified through further analysis - “that’s massively embarrassing to 
have a through wall defect on a defect shutting us down” (CS3–I11: decision 
maker). It is likely that these poor previous experiences would be 
disseminated amongst professional peer groups (see social influences 
below), influencing gatekeepers’ technology attitudes and risk percep-
tions. “Like a lot of the solutions in our industry, there’s no real root cause 
that’s fed back to the masses. You just hear “it didn’t work for [an operating 
company].” “Oh no, didn’t work for [an operating company] should we be 
doing it?” Why didn’t it work for [them]? So, yeah, it’s anecdotal evidence” 
(CS3–I2: industry technology advisor). However, it was noted that this 
was also the case for internal inspections “where people have just not 
inspected things properly” (CS3–I9: decision maker). 
Several stakeholder groups are involved in NII including industry 
bodies, the regulator, service companies who provide NII, service 
companies who provide IVI, and operators who use a mix of inspection 
methods. With so many groups involved, it is unsurprising that social 
influences were identified and that “two sides of the camp” (CS3–I9: 
decision maker) were distinguished – those who use NII extensively and 
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those who do not. This professional network has influenced the intro-
duction of NII both positively and negatively. Social influences were also 
identified at a broader industry level which was described as “a sort of 
herd instinct there. If everybody’s doing it, we’ll do it. If nobody’s doing it, 
we’re not starting first” (CS3–I7: developer). Conducting IVI appeared to 
be the subjective norm of “we’ve always done it this way” (CS3–I7: 
developer) and common practice (see organisational factors). 
Both the NII technology developers and decision makers within 
adopting organisations recognised the impact that product champions 
could have on technology uptake. Developers perceived these cham-
pions as able to see the bigger picture and recognize that there would be 
“a benefit to the business overall” (CS3–I4: developer), assigning them 
power to be able to facilitate uptake within an organisation and across 
the industry. Being supportive of the technology was not sufficient to 
support positive technology decisions, champions had “to have the au-
thority to be listened to and take actions” (CS3–I5: developer). In some 
instances the champions could act as gatekeepers, operating as a 
“matchmaker – I knew that [operating company] had an appetite internally 
to do something so I set up some meetings and it went from there” (CS3-2: 
industry technology advisor). It was acknowledged that without these 
product champions who had buy-in and were driving the uptake of NII, 
“it’s very difficult to overcome that inertia” (CS3–I6: decision maker). In 
one adopting organisation, the role of the champion was integrated into 
their adoption process of NII, including being accountable for the 
technology. “There are designated and nominated people with just such re-
sponsibilities within each building so if I go and click on any of the level two 
[inspection] procedures that we’ve got, it has a review date, and somebody is 
the owner -somebody is the originator” (CS3–I6: decision maker). 
Organisational norms and procedures around NII, inspection bud-
gets, differences amongst departments within an organisation, and 
taking a short-term view of the financial benefits of NII were found to act 
as barriers to adoption. “A conservative culture that has some resistance to 
change is not unexpected” (CS3–I8: decision maker). However, champions 
and decision makers “taking ownership of the work and sometimes chal-
lenging the decisions” (CS3–I3: decision maker) was a way of changing the 
technology adoption culture around NII. Reversing organisational pro-
cedures and norms around NII by requiring justification for IVI rather 
than NII, was found to make a significant change. “It’s a simple change, 
but I think it did change behaviours quite dramatically” (CS3–I6: decision 
maker). By embedding NII into normal working practices, it has changed 
the organisational culture towards it. Having a holistic culture of the 
benefits that NII can offer combined with a long-term vision of the 
business was valuable. It was suggested that developing a collaborative 
culture may help organisations share their experiences, lessons learnt 
and develop the required technical knowledge for effective deployment 
of NII across the industry. Leadership and support from senior man-
agement is a fundamental component of successfully introducing NII. 
These senior figures were described as buying into the benefits that NII 
offers the business and therefore to “push it out” (CS3–I1: industry 
technology advisor), rather than the asset inspection team having to sell 
it. Senior managers who send out messages around the potential value of 
NII can change priorities and decision making around it. “This can really 
get the momentum going” (CS3–I4: developer). Organisational incentives 
are a key motivator for behaviours and decision making. It was 
perceived that service companies, operators and integrity teams are not 
incentivised to try new technologies out (e.g., budgetary constraints). 
Yet, there appears to be a proportion of senior leadership that are either 
not fully aware of NII or do not directly support it, and “without that 
support, we may struggle” (CS3–I2: industry technology advisor). 
5.4. Case study results summary 
The analysis of the case study data (interview data, observations, and 
document analysis) identified six psychological categories and 15 fac-
tors as shown in Table 4. These factors were identified as influencing 
technology adoption decisions of key gatekeepers and decision makers 
(e.g., operational and technical managers) within the three case studies 
in the UKCS O&G industry. These data reflect the psychological factors 
identified within the technology adoption literature and the barriers 
highlighted in the O&G industry (Wood, 2014), supporting the P-TAF. 
Whilst not intended to test or refine prominent technology acceptance 
models, the results do reflect the factors identified across these models 
(e.g. TAM, Venkatesh and Davis, 2000; organisational technology 
adoption models, Frambach and Schillewaert, 2002). Having a more 
comprehensive psychological framework may also be useful to inform 
these models and subsequent implications for practitioners. Given that 
decision makers represented half the sample, the interview data were 
examined to determine if decision makers and developers mentioned 
different factors. The pattern of results did not indicate any clear dif-
ferences but further research with a larger sample size may be able to 
determine if the two groups (developers and decision makers) perceive 
there to be different psychological barriers to technology uptake. 
Several psychological factors were identified as central influences 
across the three case studies such as the positive or negative technology 
attitudes and trust. 
5.4.1. Within case results 
The results signalled that the impact of the psychological factors on 
gatekeepers and decision makers may vary depending on the context. 
Case study 1 characterised a start-up company which had a technology 
that was in the process of being trialled. The results indicate that per-
sonal incentives of gatekeepers and decision makers, developing a sense 
of trust with prospective clients and decision makers, and managing risk 
perceptions of the gatekeepers and decision makers in relation to the 
technologies application, were particularly relevant. In addition, the 
developers perceived social influences, in particular the impact that 
product champions (and product snipers) could have on the successful 
outcome of their technology. To a lesser extent, the developers and 
decision makers highlighted the effect that the technology adoption 
culture could have on the gatekeepers and decision makers decisions. 
Case 2 characterised a start-up company which had now reached 
commercialisation holding several contracts with tier 1 operators. The 
results suggest that the risk perceptions of gatekeepers and decision 
makers were particularly relevant, impacting on the success of the two 
technologies (SubseaT and DownholeT). This appears to have been 
affected by the technical knowledge of decision makers and champions. 
In this case, product champions were found to be highly relevant, 
influencing technology attitudes, risk perception, and social influences. 
They provided access to key gatekeepers as well as influencing the wider 
technology adoption culture of the organisation in which they work. 
Case 3 characterised a set of NII technologies that despite being well 
established continued to be resisted by industry. The results suggest that 
a combination of a lack of personal incentives, risk perceptions associ-
ated with traditional internal visual inspection and non-intrusive in-
spection, and a mixture of technical knowledge about the relative risks 
and benefits of the technologies were particularly relevant. The case 
exemplified the impact that social influences can have on uptake with 
clear social groups (IVI supporters and NII supporters). Leadership 
endorsement was perceived to be instrumental in facilitating positive 
technology adoption decisions, influencing gatekeepers’ and decision 
makers’ technology attitudes and risk perceptions. The wider technol-
ogy adoption culture, including how managers incentivised NII, influ-
enced attitudes, social influences, and risk perceptions. 
Within the first two cases, it would appear that developers placed 
significant value on the positive (or negative) influence of product 
champions. This was similar within case 3 but in this instance both the 
developers and decision makers recognised the value that product 
champions can have on facilitating uptake not only within an individual 
organisation but the wider industry. 
5.4.2. Across case results 
Across the cases, technology attitudes were identified as driving 
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technology uptake. Positive technology attitudes in which innovation 
was valuable for its impact on individual and overall business perfor-
mance, tended to support positive technology uptake decisions. On the 
other hand, negative technology attitudes in which stakeholders 
preferred the status quo, resulted in a lower appetite for technological 
change. It would appear that decision makers tended to hold more 
positive attitudes about technologies that they perceived to be less 
radical (e.g. case study 2). 
Personal incentives acted as strong motivating factors, influencing 
attitudes, risk perceptions and technology behaviours. Personal in-
centives included concerns about job security, conflicts with similar 
projects/technologies, and personal agendas, all influenced uptake de-
cisions. The results from case study 3 also indicated that the individual 
who makes the decision, may not be the one that benefits from it, de- 
motivating the desire for change. Motivations may also be influenced 
by whether the benefit is gained quickly in the short-term or slowly in 
the longer term. 
Technology decisions heavily focused on risk perception and these 
judgements required the technical knowledge to make accurate risk 
assessments. The results indicate that risk perception is linked to not 
only the technology but the context that it is used in (e.g. in case study 1 
the same technology was more readily deployed in a context which was 
perceived to be less risky). This is unsurprising given the hazardous 
environments present in the O&G, but it may be valuable to consider not 
only the risk associated with the technology but the social and envi-
ronmental context in which it is deployed. Negative previous experi-
ences of introducing new technology influenced technology attitudes, 
trust, and risk perception, even when it was not a closely comparable 
technology being deployed. These experiences may prime technology 
adoption decisions. 
The results suggest that irrespective of technology type or readiness 
level, social factors (such as developing strong professional networks 
within the technical areas, in different types of organisations, and across 
industry), were key facilitators. From both the start-up and decision 
maker in an organisation’s perspective, it was valuable to attend events 
(e.g. conferences, seminars, and accelerator programs) and get involved 
in the innovation space not only to build a strong professional network 
but to learn about the latest technologies and their potential applica-
tions. The results also suggested that social influence could be used to 
the advantage of an individual or company attempting to introduce a 
technology. By having multiple stakeholders involved, it reduced risk 
perceptions and projected these organisations’ credibility onto the 
technology (i.e., if they are using it, it must be good). 
Organisational cultures which recognize the value that technology 
can offer, promote positive subjective norms around technology and 
senior management that prioritized innovation, as well as learning from 
these innovation experiences, tended to respond more positively. 
Leadership was identified as critical for successful technology uptake, 
signalling innovations value and the organisation’s priorities through 
their communications, backed up by resources (personnel time and 
financial). A full cross-case discussion is given in the Discussion section. 
Within individual case studies there were factors which were not 
identified (e.g., collaboration culture in case study 2) or minimally 
identified across the three case studies (e.g., risk aversion). It may be 
that interviewees felt that they were not relevant, were of sensitive 
nature, were too obvious, or the underlying essence was captured by 
other sub-factors. In some instances, it may be that broader sub-factors 
may better capture the influencing factors. Whilst the researchers were 
keen to remain open to new themes, no additional psychological cate-
gories or factors were identified. 
6. Discussion 
People are a fundamental part of successful technological innova-
tion. Without the support of the influential gatekeepers, it is unlikely 
that a novel technology will be introduced to an organisation, which can 
result in significant financial losses if the product proves to be successful. 
Consequently, understanding the psychological factors that impact upon 
the adoption process is crucial to ensure that the potential of innovation 
is maximized. The case studies illustrate the cutting-edge technology 
which continues to be developed in O&G and that lies just beneath the 
surface of the industries’ conservative reputation. The results bring to 
the fore the sometimes-hidden psychological facilitators and barriers 
that influence technology adoption decisions in O&G. Insight into these 
influencing factors can be utilized to support effective technology up-
take directly within O&G but also indirectly in other sectors which are 
experiencing a combination of digitalisation and resistance to technol-
ogy (Nambisan et al., 2019). 
6.1. Psychological technology adoption framework 
Our case studies provided further evidence to support the set of 15 
factors in the new Psychological Technology Adoption Framework (P- 
TAF) developed for upstream oil and gas, as shown in Table 4. The 
psychological factors identified within the case studies can all be sepa-
rately found within prominent models of adoption at the individual (e.g. 
Venkatesh et al., 2003), group (e.g. Hughes et al., 2018) and organisa-
tional level (e.g. Frambach and Schillewaert, 2002), indicating that 
these are underlying determining factors for technology adoption de-
cisions. For example, risk, trust, and social influence have been found to 
impact on technology introduction in a range of industries such as 
e-commerce (Pavlou, 2003), food manufacturing (Makkonen et al., 
2016) and autonomous vehicle driving (Endsley, 2017). Despite the 
inclusion of some of these factors in dominant models, this is the first 
comprehensive framework that outlines the key psychological factors 
that influence corporate consumers within the organisational context. 
Our case studies add to this nascent research area by providing empirical 
support for the set of factors included in the P-TAF. 
The role of technological gatekeepers is well recognised within the 
innovation literature (Allen and Cohen, 1969; Nochur and Allen, 1992) 
and has been studied in a range of domains (e.g., medicine; Carlsen and 
Norheim, 2003) but less so in oil and gas (Cullen, 2011). The results 
emphasize the critical role that gatekeepers and champions play in 
facilitating or blocking technology adoption within upstream O&G. In 
this context, gatekeepers and champions were typically technical or 
operational managers who understood the technical area and the 
problem that they technology was addressing, with budget holders being 
perceived to hold considerable decision-making power. They could also 
include industry advisors, senior management in current or potential 
client organisations or opinion leaders. Whilst both developers and de-
cision makers recognize the impact that people within these roles can 
have, the results suggest that this power is more keenly felt by de-
velopers who are at an earlier-stage of development and deployment. It 
may be that more established companies have wider social networks, 
stronger reputation, and credibility so they feel less at the mercy of 
gatekeepers and snipers/champions. The case study results indicate that 
decision makers are influenced by a range of psychological factors, in 
particular their technology attitudes, personal incentives, risk percep-
tion and technical knowledge. These factors also appear to interact with 
social influences (e.g., having attitudes informed by others in a social 
network), particularly product champions. Given that gatekeepers are 
not always formal/explicit or observable, they may be able to wield a 
greater influence than is commonly attributed to them (e.g., ignoring a 
pitch request or being unwilling to pass on details to a relevant 
colleague). The interview results suggest that product champions are 
well recognised for the positive impact that they can make but that 
gatekeepers and decision makers are less well understood. Conse-
quently, it is pertinent to understand the psychological factors that in-
fluence these essential individuals. 
The following sections will briefly discuss the overarching psycho-
logical categories, highlighting the main facilitating factors and poten-
tial barriers. 
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6.1.1. Personality factors 
From the individual corporate decision maker’s perspective, inno-
vativeness was found to be influential, (Perrons et al., 2018; Tabak and 
Barr, 1999), particularly the innovativeness of leaders and product 
champions. This factor appears to be similar to domain-specific inno-
vativeness (Goldsmith and Hofacker, 1991) and technological innova-
tiveness (Thakur et al., 2016). Examination of how innovativeness 
influences technology adoption decisions may be valuable as a future 
research avenue (e.g. as a selection tool), with a similar approach 
applied to procurement (Steenstra et al., 2020). Risk aversion which had 
previously been identified as a relevant factor (Oyovwevto, 2014; OGTC 
and ABB, 2018) was not frequently mentioned within the case studies. 
However, in the case in which it was mentioned, the technology was 
perceived to be radical. This supports the idea that risk aversion may be 
intensified for radical technologies (Assink, 2006; Radnejad and Vre-
denburg, 2019). 
6.1.2. Attitude factors 
Factors such as personal incentives, previous experiences, informa-
tion gathered through social networks and risk perception as well as 
organisational norms influence technology attitudes. A cross section of 
attitudes were identified in the case studies. The perceived value a 
technology may offer to the way the individual worked, to the business 
and/or to the industry overall was balanced against skepticism and poor 
previous experiences of technologies. Trust was identified as a critical 
attitudinal facilitator in the introduction of new technology in O&G 
particularly in uncertain or risky situations (Kaur and Rampersad, 2018; 
Pavlou, 2003). In particular, it was identified as crucial for start-ups to 
develop a sense of trust between them and their clients, not only around 
the individual contact but with the wider company and technology. One 
method of increasing perceptions of credibility, trust and familiarity was 
to use product champions. These are individuals who are well respected 
within their domain, use the right language to sell the product and see 
the potential value/impact of that it could have, and who use their 
extensive network to ‘sell’ the product to other network contacts 
(Markham and Aiman-Smith, 2001). 
6.1.3. Motivation factors 
Personal incentives and fear of technology failure acted as strong 
motivating factors, influencing attitudes, risk perceptions, and tech-
nology behaviours. In terms of innovative individuals, motivation to 
introduce new technology may be intrinsic (i.e. they do it because they 
enjoy the activity of introducing and using new technology). However, 
the results suggest that these may be extrinsic motivational factors (i.e., 
they do it because of external sources such as organisational pressures) 
(Herath, 2010). Personal incentives focused on concerns over job secu-
rity, budgets, and clashes with internal projects which may conflict with 
the new technologies. Organisational culture would likely also influence 
motivations through norms, priorities (e.g., cost cutting) and strategies 
(e.g., the way in which departmental budgets are governed). The role of 
motivation on technology adoption is unsurprising given that it has been 
identified as a central factor for technology adoption behaviours in other 
sectors (e.g., agriculture (Herath, 2010), e-commerce (Abu Bakar and 
Ahmed, 2015) and online security (Chenoweth et al., 2009). Practi-
tioners involved in technology adoption would be wise to consider the 
underlying motivations that drive clients’, managers’, and end-users’ 
behaviours. 
6.1.4. Cognitive factors 
The perceived risks associated with introducing a technology was 
identified as a psychological factor for technology decisions in all three 
cases. This reflects the wider innovation literature (Ghadim et al., 2005; 
Paluch and Wünderlich, 2016) and illustrates to start-ups the value of 
framing risk, value proposition and motivations. Risk judgments are 
closely linked to perceptions of certainty, memories of (positive or 
negative) previous experiences with introducing new technologies, and 
the level of technical knowledge that the decision maker holds (Barham 
et al., 2014; Ghadim et al., 2005). Technical knowledge and expertise 
are crucial for accurate risk assessments when introducing an innovation 
into a system (Damanpour et al., 2018). Several interviewees noted that 
lack of technical knowledge erroneously increased risk perceptions of 
prospective clients who did not fully understand the purpose, value, or 
potential broader implications of the technology for their business. The 
outsourcing of knowledge and reductions of workforce, seen in many 
industries, has shifted the locus of knowledge in some instances away 
from the decision maker (Perrons, 2014). 
6.1.5. Social factors 
Social factors such as professional peer networks and subjective 
norms were found to influence technology adoption decisions and be-
haviours. Individuals would seek validation about a potential technol-
ogy from others in their network (e.g. have they heard of the technology, 
was it valuable, and would they recommend it?). Utilising social net-
works was highly valuable for start-ups who lacked trustworthiness. 
Recruiting product champions was a way of overcoming limited social 
networks, gaining credibility, and access to potential clients. In the 
wider context social factors such as social influence and word of mouth 
have already been found to influence rejection decisions in late adopters 
(Jahanmir and Cavadas, 2018), such as those characterised by the O&G 
industry. This may be relevant for those involved in technology adoption 
practices within late adoption organisations and industries. 
6.1.6. Organisational factors 
Organisational cultures which recognize the value that technology 
can offer, promote positive subjective norms around technology and 
senior management that prioritized innovation, as well as learning from 
these innovation experiences, tended to respond more positively to 
innovation (Daneshy and Bahorich, 2005). In contrast, organisational 
cultures that were characterised by a short-term approach and were 
perceived to have a pervasive fear of technology failure, stifled inno-
vation and tended to stick with the status quo. As innovation typically 
adds value through long-term gains, this may be in contrast with the 
perceived competitive short-term O&G industry culture (Hirsch et al., 
2005). Given that much of the technological advancement in O&G, as 
well as for many sectors experiencing digitalisation, hinges on collabo-
ration and sharing of information, having a collaborative culture which 
is willing to share non-critical resources and has a high absorptive ca-
pacity could increase the receptivity to innovative and new ways of 
working (Radnejad and Vredenburg, 2017). Tentative steps to sup-
porting collaboration have already been taken such as through open 
innovation (Radnejad and Vredenburg, 2017) and strategic dalliances 
(Noke et al., 2008). Consequently, being able to improve technology 
adoption cultures could be highly valuable through measurement and 
benchmarking exercises. 
6.2. Case comparisons 
Across all three case studies almost all the psychological factors were 
identified demonstrating that they are important, irrespective of 
context. However, the results also indicated that specific factors may 
particularly influence technology adoption decisions in specific con-
texts. The involvement of innovative individuals and product champions 
were particularly relevant for companies that were seeking validation 
trials for unproven technologies or at the early stages of commerciali-
sation. For very early-stage technologies, such as that outlined in case 
study 1, identifying and gaining access to the relevant expertise to assess 
the potential risks, benefits and applications was important. Where in-
dividuals and/or technologies were unproven, developing a sense of 
credibility and trust with clients was crucial for winning funding for 
trials or early stages of commercialisation. For technologies that were 
well-established but continued to be resisted, organisational culture was 
identified as a key facilitator. Organisations which fostered a positive 
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technology adoption culture, combined with innovative individuals and 
leadership support, tended to be more responsive to trying innovative 
technologies. Where leadership was not present, technology uptake was 
sluggish. Overall, the case study results emphasize the point that it is not 
sufficient to have a technically competent technology but that it must 
also be presented in a way that encourages decision makers, end-users 
and organisations to become receptive to it. 
6.3. Industrial context 
In comparison with oil and gas, similar psychological factors have 
been identified in other industries such as risk aversion (e.g. defence; 
Greiner and Franza, 2003), technology attitudes (e.g. IT Systems; Davis 
et al., 1989; automated driving; Ghazizadeh et al., 2012) and organ-
isational culture (e.g. IT systems, Frambach and Schillewaert (2002); 
and manufacturing (Kratzer et al., 2017). However, given the high risk, 
high reliability nature of the oil and gas industry, risk perception and 
technical knowledge were identified as prominent variables, as well as 
how leaders manage technology adoption cultures. 
The O&G industry may be perceived as facing a unique problem; 
however, they appear to share many characteristics with other in-
dustries. Examples include the high risk, high reliability nature (e.g. 
healthcare), financial implications of failure (e.g. banking), automation 
(e.g. motor manufacturing), increasing governmental focus on the 
environmental impact (e.g. aviation) and decommissioning (e.g. nuclear 
power). Furthermore, they are not the only industry to have a reputation 
for being resistive to adopt new technology (e.g. healthcare; Williams 
and Dickinson, 2010) but need it to remain competitive. It is likely that 
many more sectors will experience the paradox between embracing 
technology and the resistance to innovation as a result of introducing 
digitalisation, as well as the adoption of new technologies in response to 
the Covid-19 pandemic (Clipper, 2020; Juergensen et al., 2020). 
Consequently, those working to introduce innovation in industries 
outside of O&G may recognize similarities in the case study results and 
may find that the P-TAF is valuable for better understanding, and 
effectively implementing, technology into their own organisation. 
Research looking at the energy efficiency paradox may illustrate 
similarities to the psychological factors identified as impacting on 
technology adoption decision making. The energy efficiency gap rep-
resents companies’ resistance to uptake energy efficient technologies, 
despite their relative advantages and cost savings. Similar adoption 
barriers to those identified within O&G have been highlighted in the 
construction industry such as industry culture, no long-term incentive or 
interest in a project, competitive tendering, and poor collaboration be-
tween stakeholders (Sorrell, 2003). It has been posited that a combi-
nation of market and behavioural barriers (e.g. salience, inattention, 
heuristics decision making, and loss aversion) may reduce uptake of 
energy efficient technologies across sectors (Gerarden et al., 2017). 
Psychological/behavioural barriers such as perceived risks, motivations, 
cognitive resources, and preference for the status quo, have been found 
to contribute to slow investment in green technologies (Knobloch and 
Mercure, 2016). Given the increasing need to invest in green, energy 
efficient technologies as part of the climate crisis and the energy tran-
sition, it is expected that these psychological and behavioural factors 
will become increasing pertinent. 
6.4. Limitations & future research 
The case studies add to the literature by confirming the compre-
hensive set of the psychological factors that can impact on technology 
adoption in O&G, however there are methodological limitations. In-
terviews provide self-reported data and can be subject to bias, as well as 
motivational agendas (Rowley, 2012). These motivational agendas may 
have been present within the sample (e.g. motivations from technology 
providers to convey a particular narrative around their innovation). To 
support content validity, the sample was selected with participants from 
different organisations, roles, and perspectives within the UK conti-
nental shelf (UKCS). This included interviewing those outside the 
technology companies (e.g. current and/or prospective clients, industry 
experts) to get a wider perspective. Initially this posed a challenge as 
individuals from the technology developer companies were reluctant to 
share contact information and were concerned that asking their poten-
tial clients to take part in the study could jeopardize future business. 
Whilst their concerns were alleviated and potential decision makers 
from client organisations were interviewed, further research would 
benefit from gathering a wider decision-making sample (e.g., senior 
managers and budget holders in potential client organisations). 
The addition of observational data and document analysis while on a 
small scale, supplemented the interview material. The document anal-
ysis was beneficial for providing additional contextual information 
which assisted in the identification of psychological factors. However, 
alternative samples from other basins (e.g., Gulf of Mexico) or other 
industries within the energy sector (e.g. offshore renewables or nuclear 
power) may have identified alternative psychological factors as influ-
encing technology uptake decisions. This expresses the wider issue of 
external validity and generalizability of qualitative research. Further-
more, despite attempts to collect a larger sample of cases, only three 
were examined. We would invite researchers to apply the framework to 
case studies examining technology adoption in other sectors such as 
business, healthcare, and IT systems. 
The types of technologies examined within the case studies may also 
reduce the generalizability of the findings. For example, cases 1 and 2 
focused on tangible, physical technologies that could be handled by 
prospective clients. Whilst case 3’s technology includes a combination of 
physical hardware and analysis software; the psychological factors that 
influence uptake of digital technologies may vary from physical tech-
nologies (e.g. Adjekum et al., 2018). Given the uptake of digital tech-
nologies as part of digitalisation, this may be a valuable avenue for 
further research not only for application in O&G but in healthcare, 
manufacturing, and business. 
Whilst examining demographic characteristics (e.g., age, income, 
educational level) was outwith the scope of the study, it is possible that 
these may have influenced technology adoption decisions, as has been 
found for age effects in consumer technology acceptance (Arning and 
Ziefle, 2007), leaving a potential route for future research. 
As for many models, the psychological factors appear to be interre-
lated, overlapping with each other (e.g., innovativeness may influence 
risk perception and technology attitudes). To address the issue of 
circularity of reasoning, the authors remained open to any additional 
psychological factors which may influence technology decisions within 
the case studies. It should be noted that additional non-psychological 
factors (environmental factors) were mentioned but not included as 
they were out with the research scope. Furthermore, the addition of the 
non-psychologist authors who did not have strong preconceptions about 
these factors was valuable for a rigorous discussion of the results. 
However, the coding analysis was based on a preliminary framework (P- 
TAF) devised by the authors and although the method was designed to 
identify any additional factors, it would be beneficial to have the set of 
15 factors tested by an independent investigation, particularly the cat-
egorisation and labelling of the factors. It is possible that different fac-
tors influence individual consumers and corporate consumers differently 
(e.g., a corporate consumer may be influenced by organisational cul-
ture) but is also feasible that O&G terminology refers to these underlying 
factors using different terms (e.g. relative advantage may be included 
within risk perception). This may be a valuable route for further 
investigation. Ongoing research will seek to quantitatively test this 
model by building the key factors into a predictive model which will 
allow the influence that these factors have on technology adoption de-
cisions to be tested. 
Given the value that Roger’s DOI model (2003) has provided for the 
innovation literature and that practitioners are familiar with it, further 
research could apply these psychological factors to the 5 stages of 
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diffusion as it is likely that their impact will differ. This approach could 
be valuable for developing stage-specific interventions. 
6.5. Practical implications 
There are several potential routes for supporting technology adop-
tion by leveraging the influence of psychological factors identified 
within the case studies from both the buyer and seller perspective. The 
results suggest that sellers (e.g., technology developers and service 
companies) and buyers (e.g., customer organisations wishing to intro-
duce a technology) may face different psychological barriers when 
trying to adopt a technology. Within the case material on the psycho-
logical factors, there were examples given relating to best practices and 
these are summarised Appendix B. Further examination of these psy-
chological factors is required to provide robust recommendations, 
however preliminary suggestions are outlined below to give the reader 
indications on how they may facilitate technology uptake in their own 
organisations. 
Both technologies and their parent companies can be at different 
developmental stages and, as a consequence, may face different psy-
chological barriers. The case studies suggest that from a start-up 
perspective, psychological factors such as trust, product champions 
and gaining access to expertise appear to be pertinent. Given that 
securing funding and access for field trials can be a complex process for 
even the most experienced individuals, start-up companies may find 
value in a guide which outlines how to jump these psychological 
barriers. 
Whilst there is a considerable research base on organisational culture 
for innovation (Frambach and Schillewaert, 2002; Radnejad and Vre-
denburg, 2017), there does not appear to be an empirically based 
measure for an organisation’s technology adoption culture in O&G. 
Recent research has highlighted the need for organisations’ cultures to 
be receptive to new ways of working and technology (Lokuge et al., 
2019; Webster and Gardner, 2019), therefore developing an organisa-
tional technology adoption culture may be valuable for supporting 
technology uptake (e.g., for benchmarking technology adoption culture 
activities (Radnejad and Vredenburg 2017; Pak et al., 2019). 
7. Conclusion 
Technology advancement is vital for the future of not only the oil and 
gas industry but a sustainable energy supply within our lifetimes. Many 
people continue to work relentlessly developing technological solutions 
to these problems; however, their innovations are only successful if they 
are taken off the proverbial shelf, adopted and used. For a new tech-
nology to be successful, it needs to not only be technically competent but 
presented to potential buyers in a way that organisations, leaders, and 
end-users are receptive to it. Understanding the psychological factors 
that drive technology adoption is a key part of that success. 
Our case study research addresses this challenge by confirming the 
key psychological factors (in P-TAF) that influence corporate technology 
adoption decision makers within the upstream oil and gas industry. 
Whilst the factors can all be separately found within prominent models 
of technology adoption, there was not a comprehensive framework that 
outlines the key psychological factors influencing corporate consumers 
within the organisational context. Given the potential benefits of digi-
talisation, understanding the organisational innovation adoption pro-
cess, and the psychological factors which influence it, will become 
increasingly pertinent to technology developers, organisational leaders, 
and policy makers. 
The innovativeness of the decision makers, their technology atti-
tudes, their trust in the technology and its stakeholders, personal in-
centives and their social network will all influence their decision to 
introduce a technology (or not). Their risk perception of the innovation 
will be influenced by their technical knowledge and their previous ex-
periences. The organisational culture in which they work will influence 
all aspects of their decision-making process, driving motivations, atti-
tudes, and risk perceptions. Most of all, leaders can direct organisational 
values, resources, and the way that technology adoption is embraced. 
The three case studies have provided indications of the psychological 
facilitators and barriers, which can be studied to inform the design of 
actionable tools and recommendations. It is hoped that this under-
standing may be used both by academics to advance knowledge of the 
innovation process and by practitioners trying to smooth the bumpy 
road to deployment and adoption. In essence, our study illustrates the 
power that people hold to make an innovation a success or a failure. 
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Appendix A – Case Study Interview Schedule 
Each interview will take approximately 1 hour to 90 minutes – this can be split into two separate 
interviews depending on time constraints. It will ask about your job, the technology itself, the 
company and people involved in developing the technology, and your experiences of introducing this 
new technology into the UKCS oil and gas sector. This will include discussing key milestones in the 
development and introduction of the technology and the potential psychological/human factors 
involved. You will be asked to discuss the barriers and facilitators that impacted on your experience. 
General Questions (Initial Interview) 
Background information  
1. Can you tell me your job title and a bit about your role within your organization?  
a. How does is this involved in relation to the technology we are going to be talking 
about (e.g. NII)? 
2. How long have you been doing that job? (may want to know about previous job (s) if 
relevant) 
a. Have you worked in any sectors outside of oil and gas? 
b. Have you worked in any other continental shelves other than the UKCS? 
3. Could you give me a background on yourself and why you got involved in this 
company/project?  
a. Have you been involved in other start-up businesses? (If so, could you give me 
a brief background?) 
4. What are your experiences generally in getting technology introduced in oil and gas?  
a. Have you introduced this technology or other technologies in other industries?  
The Technology  
1. Could you tell me about the technology? 
2. Describe in detail, including original idea creation, development and deployment, of 
the innovation.  
a. Focused questioning around the identified products for analysis 
3. What was the problem/gap? 
4. What is its value proposition? 
5. Do you consider this to be a radical technology? 
a. Do your clients perceive this to be a radical technology? 
b. Is there something similar in the market? 
6. What market is this technology aimed at? 
a. Was it developed in another industry? 
7. Has this technology been used in O&G before? 
a. Does it have any simulation/test data? 
b. Has it been trialed in O&G? If so, where and what were the outcomes? 
8. What stage is the technology at? (e.g. mvp, trialed, partial deployment, full adoption in 
another sector? 
9. Are there any other relevant things that I need to know about the current status of the 
technology? 
a. E.g. IP issues, collaboration negotiations, planned trials, etc.  
The company & people involved in the technology 
10. Could you tell me about what the ethos around the company? 
a. It is new or established? 
b. Has the company worked in O&G before? 
c. Has the company worked in other industries before? 
11. Has the company been involved in incubator programs? 
a. If so, could you tell me a bit about this experience?  
b. Did you find it useful and if so, in what way? 
12. Let’s talk about the people involved in developing and introducing the technology. 
Could you tell me about your experience in developing and introducing new technology 
generally? (Only need to repeat if unclear in beginning).  
13. Could you tell me about the key stakeholders involved in the company and technology? 
(take notes and draw schematic if required). 
a. Key staff, investors, collaborations (both internal and internal) 
b. What are the backgrounds of the key stakeholders? 
c. Are the key stakeholders knowledgeable about the technology? 
d. What do each of the stakeholders bring to the technology? 
Technology Journey  
The purpose of the following questions is to develop an initial timeline surrounding the technology so 
as to be able to effectively probe the potential psychological barriers in subsequent 
interviews/questions. 
14. Can you outline the key dates surrounding the technology development and 
introduction? 
o Initial idea, development milestones, key pitches and events, initial trials and pilot 
studies.  
15. What was your initial plan for introduction and how does that compare with what 
actually happened? (did you pivot, why, how, outcome) 
o What did you expect and not expect? 
16. Break down of the key stages of getting to market and deployment 
o Draw out on sheets of paper or on touch screen 
o Use this to direct subsequent interviews 
Focused key stage discussion (interviews 2-5 for each case study) 
The purpose of the following interviews is to build upon the initial interview and timeline to discuss 
the key barriers and facilitators that occurred at each of the technologies key milestones, focusing on 
psychological factors. For ease, this discussion is broken down into four overall sections (some may be 
more or less relevant depending on the case). 
• Getting this technology to market? 
• Getting this technology trialed? 
• Getting this technology deployed (partial and full) 
• Getting this technology adopted 
Key Stages Questions  
1. Could you tell me about the overall experience of getting this technology to 
market/trialed/deployed/adopted? 
2. Generally, what do you feel have been the technical factors that have influenced the 
introduction (getting to market/trialed/deployed/adopted) of the technology? 
a. Probe to identify if any of these technical issues relate to psychological factors.  
3. Generally, what do you feel have been the psychological factors that have influenced the 
introduction (getting to market/trialed/deployed/adopted) of the technology? 
a. See psychological probe questions below.  
4. What difficulties have you faced? 
a. What do you think the common pitfalls are for introducing a new technology into oil 
and gas? 
5. How did you tackle these difficulties? 
a. Utilize any psychological factors? 
6. What do you feel helped? 
a. See Psychological probes.  
7. If there are multiple technologies, are there any differences in the introduction experience? 
a. How do you feel these psych factors interacted with the different technologies? 
8. What would you do differently? 
a. what do you think would help someone else in a similar situation? 
9. In your own words, what do you think would help support technology deployment and 
adoption? 
a. At a sector level  
b. At an organizational level  
c. At an end-user level  
Psychological probe questions (use in conjunction with Q 2-6 above) 
10. Personality traits 
b. Of company/team 
c. Gate keepers and decision makers 
d. Leadership (if involved) 
11. Attitudes 
e. Could you tell me about the prevalent attitudes towards the company and the 
technology? 
f. What attitudes have you faced, both positive and negative? 
g. In what way was trust an influencing factor? 
h. How did you develop credibility for yourself, the company and the product and do you 
feel it was successful? 
12. Cognitive 
i. What were the risks that potential clients anticipated with your product? 
i. Were these risks different to your perceptions of risk? 
j. How did you respond to these risks? 
i. What did you do to address this in communications about the technology with 
potential clients? 
k. Could you tell me about the level of perceived uncertainty associated with the 
technology? 
l. Could you tell me about the relevant expertise available and required for the product? 
i. Was there always sufficient expertise available to assess  
m. What factors do you feel decision makers were using when assessing the potential of 
your product? 
13. Social 
n. Describe what the interaction with potential clients, stakeholders and general industry 
has been like?  
o. In what way do you feel your social/professional network has influenced the outcome 
of the product? 
p. Did you utilize product champions and technical experts? 
i. How did you get their buy in and how did you utilize their influence? 
q. In what way do you feel the teams and social groups you have interacted with 
influenced the outcome? 
i. Teams killing the project 
14. Organizational 
r. Can you describe the different organizations that you have interacted with response 
towards the company and the technology? 
s. How has senior leadership influenced the outcome? 
t. Could you talk a bit about the different organizational/adoption cultures that you have 
experienced? 
15. Barriers and Facilitator Questions 
16. Generally, what do you think has helped and hindered? 
17. What would you do differently and what do you think would help someone else in a similar 
situation? 
18. What do you think the common pitfalls are for introducing a new technology into oil and 
gas? 
19. What did you do to address each of the key psych factors? 
20. Can you tell me if there any practical day to day improvements that would help you in terms 





Appendix B – Practical Recommendations 
Within the case material on the psychological factors, there were examples given relating to 
best practices and these are summarised in the table below. Further research will be required 
to further elucidate these practical recommendations.  
Best practices for technology adoption as based upon the case materials including the relating 
psychological factor (shown in brackets) and support quotes from the data. 
Best Practices (psychological 
factor) 
Supporting advice from the data 
Involvement of product 
champions and innovative 
individuals (innovativeness & 
social influences). 
“Knowing who is innovative, that’s your product champions, 
these are individuals who are willing to try something. You 
want to get them on board.” (CS2-I2) 
Recognizing negative technology 
attitudes and responding to these 
appropriately (technology 
attitudes). 
“We met this guy and within five minutes of this meeting, were 
like “yeah, we’re not getting anything with this.” So, identifying 
those who perhaps just don’t value the technology, and just 
manoeuvring round them.” (CS1-I3) 
Developing a sense of trust and 
credibility with potential clients 
and contacts (trust). 
“So, you’ve got credibility from the [innovation center], but 
not just field trials, that the [technology] has been used in 
multiple situations and contexts by a number of different 
companies.” (CS2-I4) 
Understanding individuals’ 
motivations around new 
technologies and taking actions to 
address these directly (personal 
incentives) 
“People applying for their own jobs, their focus is not on new 
tech. You’ve just got to understand that and then make the 
correct decisions from resource allocation saying “okay, that’s 
not a customer which is going to run my technology now 
because it just doesn’t suit their place.”” (CS2-I3) 
Articulating a clear value 
proposition (risk perception) and 
educating prospective clients 
about it including a clear business 
case to leadership (technical 
knowledge). 
“It’s about making that business case not only to your 
managers but to the MD’s and leadership. So, you might have 
to sell it, the value and the risks, to multiple sets of people.” 
(CS3-I6) 
Awareness building and training 
around new technology at all 
levels (technical knowledge). 
“There is an example of how we are liaising and 
communicating, and we are almost trying to educate our 
international colleagues. We need to people understand it 
better so that they don’t just accept poor NII. (CS3-I6) 
Inclusion of multiple stakeholders 
to reduce perceived early 
adoption risks (social influence & 
risk perception). 
“The fact that there were two organisations simultaneously, 
at the same time, where we were doing this together, meant 
that one thought of the other as their kind of seconder.” (CS2-
I2) 
Early engagement of end-users to 
foster buy-in (social). 
“Positive endorsement from the end user community through 
that market validation exercise where they were asked for our 
product really boosted us.” (CS2-I4) 
Developing a broader professional 
peer community to share lessons 
and encourage collaboration 
(social influences and 
collaboration culture). 
“Different operators need to talk more as part of a group, 
because they’re all doing it, they’re all working out how to get 
NII into the system, but they’re all doing it separately. 
Whereas if they actually came together and talked about it, 
they might get some better changes quicker.” (CS3-I5) 
Encouraging organisations to take 
a holistic, long term view of the 
benefits that new technology can 
offer (organisational). 
“It was certainly an environment where we were encouraged 
to adopt and trial new technologies, and if they worked, they 
became part of the base business going forwards. We didn’t 
just give up immediately because there’s always a learning 
curve, so we did persevere with things for a while.” (CS2-I5) 
Leadership that values technology 
innovation and actively supports 
innovation and technology uptake 
(organisational). 
“If the boss upstairs thought it was a good idea and senior 
management were supportive and took an interest, that would 
certainly be one of the things that would be most likely to result 
in a change.” (CS3-I7) 
 
 
